

START OF REEL

JOB NO. F-108
AR-116-78



OPERATOR HARRIS

DATE 6-10-78

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REEL TARGET, START & END
NAVEXOS 3968

CAPELIN (SS-289)

WW II PATROL FILE

ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED.

FOR DECK LOGS JUNE - SEPTEMBER 1943
CONSULT NATIONAL ARCHIVES WHICH HAS CUSTODY

J.A. KOONTZ

Capelin

A small fish of the smelt family.

(SS-289: dp. 1,526; l. 311'9"; b. 27'3"; dr. 15'3"; s. 20 k.; cpl. 66; a. 1 4", 10 21" tt.; cl. *Gato*)

Capelin (SS-289) was launched 20 January 1943 by Portsmouth Navy Yard; sponsored by Mrs. I. C. Bogart; and commissioned 4 June 1943, Lieutenant Commander E. E. Marshall in command.

Capelin sailed from New London, Conn., 3 September 1943, bound for Brisbane, Australia, and duty with Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific. Her first war patrol, conducted in the Molucca, Flores, and Banda Seas between 30 October and 15 November, found her sinking a 3,127-ton Japanese cargo ship on 11 November off Ambon Island.

Returning to Darwin, Australia, to refit, *Capelin* put out on her second war patrol 17 November 1943, eager for new successes in the same area as that in which her first patrol took place. *Capelin* was never heard from again; radio silence was broken in the attempt to reach her on 9 December, but without success. Japanese records studied after the war listed an attack on a supposed United States submarine on 23 November, off Kace Bay, Halmahera, but the evidence of an actual contact was slight, and the action was incomplete. This is, however, the only reported attack in the appropriate area at that time. Gone without a trace, with all her gallant crew, *Capelin* must remain in the list of ships lost without a known cause.

Capelin received one battle star for World War II service. Her single war patrol was "successful." She is credited with having sunk 3,127 tons of shipping.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION • WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

SS289/416

U.S.S. CAPELIN

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
November 17, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division 161.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron Sixteen.
(3) Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289), Report of War Patrol
number one.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in Molukka, Flores and Banda Seas during the period October 30, 1943 to November 16, 1943; is forwarded herewith.

E. E. MARSHALL.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-0989C DATE 5/25/72

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FILMED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of 1st War Patrol.

A. PROLOGUE.

The U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS 289) was commissioned at Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., 4 June, 1943, completed 26 June 1943. Departed New London, Conn., 3 September 1943, having received forty (40) days training. Transited Panama Canal 13 September 1943 and reported to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet for duty with Submarines, Southwest Pacific. Arrived Brisbane, Australia, via fueling station Galapagos Islands, 13 October 1943.

Received minor refit, 6 days, from Submarine Base assisted by relief crew. Renewed fifty-eight (58) conn. rod bearings and all defective main bearings. All main engines were inspected but none overhauled.

Underway 20 October 1943. Conducted sound test and gun firing in Moreton Bay and proceeded to training area for two days training. Departed training area 22 October 1943. Arrived Darwin 29 October 1943, refueled and reported to representative of Commander Task Force Seventy-One for duty.

B. NARRATIVE.

October 30, 1943.

1000(I) Underway in accordance with Commander Task Force Seventy-One Operation Order 37-43. Captain P.G. Nichols, USN., Commander Submarine Division ONE SIXTY-TWO on board.

1120(I) Cleared swept channel. Cruising at full speed to reach eastern end of Timor at dawn.

1529(I) Made trim dive. Sighted plane, believed to be B-24, crossing astern just before diving.

1535(I) Surfaced and continued at full speed on four (4) engines.

Noon Position: Lat. 12° - 04.5' S. - Long. 130° - 07.5 E.

October 31, 1943.

0517(I) Submerged ten miles northeast of eastern tip of Timor. Checked B.T. gradient to 300 feet. Set course for Lautem, Timor.

0608(I)

Heard echo ranging, nothing in sight. Pings in groups of three or four; with two (2) seconds between pings and ten (10) to twelve (12) seconds between groups, apparently following a regular cycle. Possibly a sonic buoy is located in this passage.

0648(I) Sighted umbrella shaped structure on tall mast on top of peak on Timor, bearing approximately 270° T., from Lat. $08^{\circ} - 18.6' S.$ - Long. $127^{\circ} - 20.4' E.$ Undoubtedly a radar installation.

1025(I) Sighted bomber plane crossing bow, distance about seven miles. (Plane contact No. 1)

1030(I) Headed south to reconnoiter LOIKERO and Bay between TG. HERO and TG. CHATU.

1045 Sighted bomber off bow, 5 miles diverging. (Plane contact No. 2)

111) Having closed to within two (2) miles of beach and found no shipping or activity in villages on coast, headed out of bay.

Reconnoitered LAUTEM during afternoon. Closed to three thousand (3000) yards from village. No shipping present. Only activity noted were two trucks running between shore and village or encampment on side of hill, and apparent blasting in water west of LAUTEM. Took three (3) periscope photographs. Possible radar mast on hill southwest of LAUTEM.

1714(I) Held rig for depth charge and silent running drill.

1932 Surfaced ten (10) miles north of LAUTEM. Conning Tower hatch mechanism jammed two turns short of the unlocked position. Sent an officer and one (1) lookout to bridge via gun access hatch and forced Conning Tower hatch open with wrench. Once opened, hatch mechanism locked and unlocked freely.

1935(I) Set course to pass east of TUKANG BESI ISLANDS via WETAR PASSAGE.

Many clusters of brilliant lights on east end of WETAR ISLAND, visible 15 miles; indicate possible construction work at this point, although WETAR supposedly has no good anchorages or landing places.

Noon Position: Lat. $8^{\circ} - 17' S.$ - Long. $127^{\circ} - 5' E.$

NOVEMBER 1, 1943.

0530(I) Submerged.

0644(I) No contacts on "SD" Radar. Surfaced and set course for junction of BUTON PASSAGE - AMBON route with route from north of BARRIER to SORONG.

Hatch jammed again. Still unable to locate trouble (See Material defects).

1443(I) Patrolling on surface across BUTON PASSAGE - AMBON shipping lane, maintaining continuous periscope watch. Visibility excellent. Conducted radar tracking exercise for fire control party.

2003(I) Set course for BUTON PASSAGE.

2015(I) Radar contact dead ahead, range 7050.

Preliminary tracking showed target westbound, raising the question of how he got by our surface patrol across his track. As we started on end around chase, radar and T.D.C. rapidly established enemy speed as zero, and on discovering a black cloud on the true bearing we realized radar had picked up an ironized cloud. Was just about to reduce speed when radar reported a target astern, range 1550 yards. Although visibility was at least 3000 yards, could see nothing, but plot and T.D.C. checked target as chasing us from astern with small angle on bow at 18 knots. Made ready stern tubes and made several course changes to shake off this relentless phantom patrol boat, who skilfully followed all our maneuvers at ranges of 1250 to 1600 yards. The pip was definite and steady, and ranges and bearings checked nicely. Finally decided radar had gremlins and resumed original course and speed, after which the pip disappeared. Apparently radar picked up our wake when we increased speed during the approach on the cloud. Our "SJ" radar, which has never been satisfactory in sensitivity, has recently been readjusted and since then has been picking up everything from land at 45000 yards through birds at 1000 yards to phantoms at 700 yards.

2200(H) Heading for BUTON PASSAGE, intending to transit during night and proceed to POMI IAL.

2300(H) Radar indications of land did not check with our D.R. position. Position doubtful with no evening stars and two hours of chasing our tail. Decided to patrol northern end of BUTON PASSAGE during night and enter the passage tomorrow after fixing our position.

Noon Position: Lat. 5° -31' S Long. 124°-59'E.

November 2, 1943

- 0549 Submerged.
- 0850 Sighted WANGIWANGI ISLAND.
- 0909 Surfaced, after a prolonged tussle with the Conning Hatch and started for BUTON PASSAGE, circling northern end of WANGIWANGI at minimum range of 11 miles.
- 1145 Dived to avoid detection by several sail boats standing up passage.
- 1957(I) Surfaced in BUTON PASSAGE.
- Noon Position: Lat. 5°-10' S. Long. 123°-24' E.

November 3, 1943.

- 0500(H) Submerged to seaward of TIORO STRAIT, in position to cover traffic from that strait and coastal route from POMALAA, which we were unable to reach this morning.
- 1050(H) Sighted smoke west of KABAENA ISLAND, headed for it. Target drawing to westward, so ran on normal approach course at 6 knots. (Ship contact No. 1)
- 1229(H) Target still not visible, decided he was headed for SALIER STRAIT.
- 1244(H) Surfaced and began end around chase at 19 knots in attempt to reach SALIER STRAIT ahead of target without being sighted.
- 1450(H) Radar picked up target at 30,000 yards at which time his mast and top of stacks could be seen by periscope, angle on bow 120 starboard. Since he would reach the Strait two hours before darkness and we would have to wait for night-fall to go through, at
- 1503 (H) Abandoned chase, submerged to prepare contact report.
- 1821(H) Surfaced and attempted to transmit contact report. Unable to clear on higher frequencies.
- 1840(H) Sighted ZERO Fighter coming in fast on our beam, and dived. (Plane contact No. 3)
- 1853(H) Surfaced and sent contact report.
- Headed for BINGKOKA BAY and POMALAA.
- Noon Position: Lat. 4°-55.5 S. - Long. 121°-29.4' E.

November 4, 1943.

Patrolling entrances to POMALAA, BINGKOKA BAY GULF
of BONI.

0433(H) Dived to avoid sighting by sail boat

Patrolled west of PADAMARANG ISLAND in position to cover
exit between PADAMARANG and MANIANG ISLANDS. Maneuvered
for clear view into POMALAA and into KOKALA anchorage.

0708(H) Sighted plane by periscope. Increased depth to 150 feet.
Not detected. Resumed periscope patrol at
(Plane contact No. 4)

0722(H) Made periodic careful sweeps with 14 feet of periscope,
first checking for planes with "SD" radar, switching
variac on and off to minimize possibility of D.F.
detection. No activity noted anywhere in this desolated
bay.

1845(H) Surfaced.

Made three radar approaches between surfacing and midnight
on possible patrol craft. One was lost and other two
turned out to be sail boats.

Noon Position: Lat. 4°-9 S. Long. 121° - 17' E.

November 5, 1943.

0002(H) Closed sailboat which had been tracked by radar from 5000
yards range. Had 20 mm manned and intended to board it
but it proved to be so small, fishy and dirty that we
abandoned the idea. Three natives ducked out of sight as
we came alongside. Cleared on course for BUTON PASSAGE until
sailboat was out of sight and radar range, in case natives
might report the contact, then circled to westward and set
course for SALLER STRAIT.

0447(H) Dived. Patrolled 4 miles east of strait. Nothing sighted
except numerous sailboats.

1843(H) Surfaced. Patrolling east of strait in bright moonlight.

2136(H) Sighted ship in strait on easterly course; radar range
16000 yards. Ship was sharply silhouetted, and appeared
to have shape of destroyer or escort vessel, from what
could be seen at that range and small angle on bow. Tracked
her at 9 knots on course 050 T. until she stopped in center
of strait for about twenty minutes. Visibility was too
great for surface attack. (Ship contact No. 2)

November 5, 1943 (Cont'd).

CAPELIN was in excellent tracking position, as strait was clearly visible while background east of us was very hazy. On the chance this was an escort making a rendezvous with a ship or convoy, decided to set tight and wait, patrolling in and out of moon streak six to ten miles from strait.

- 2226(H) Ship suddenly moved southward toward SALIER ISLAND and disappeared in background of land.

Continued patrol with one eye on possible approaches of larger ship(s) and other carefully watching for surprise attacks from the haze between CAPELIN and SALIER ISLAND.

Noon Position: Lat. $5^{\circ}42'$ S. - Long. $121^{\circ}35.5'$ E.

November 6, 1943.

- 0444(H) Dived. Patrolled east of SALIER STRAIT.

- 1436(H) Sighted small tug or coastal steamer rounding TG. LASSA. Very indistinct due to land background and range of about 16000 yards. Tracked her in hopes she was heading into GULF of BONI where we could break the monotony with a gun attack tonight but she turned west hugging the coast and disappeared. (Ship contact No. 3)

- 1852(H) Surfaced. Continued patrol east of strait. There must be some traffic in this area, and this seems as likely a spot as any, so have decided to wait it out here.

Sailboats, small schooners in the GULF of BONI are a nuisance and a problem. It is difficult to avoid detection by them, yet attacking them seems pointless, as all that we have observed closely are manned by natives and it appears doubtful if they are serving any useful purpose to the Japs.

Noon Position: Lat. $5^{\circ}42.2'$ S. - Long. $120^{\circ}34.8'$ E.

November 7, 1943.

(Remaining times all "How")

- 0445 Submerged. Patrolled on N-S line five miles east of Strait from TG LASSA to SARONTANG ISLAND.
- 0625 Plane contact by "SD" radar, 18 miles. (Plane contact number 5).
- 1851 Surfaced. Spent next two hours making approaches on ships which all turned out to be sailboats when range closed to about 4000 yards.
- 2030 Set course for DARWIN at speed 17 knots, intending to patrol from BATOE ATA to MORO MAHO ISLANDS enroute, since previous patrols indicate use of that route from AMBON to SALLER STRAIT.

Decision to return Capt. Nichols early based upon recurrent jamming of C.T. hatch, which is getting worse and may start jamming on closing, and the desire to spend the period of full moon away from the coast since this side trip must be made anyway.

Noon Position: Long. $120^{\circ} - 32.7'$ E. Lat. $05^{\circ} - 37.8'$ S.

November 8, 1943.

- 0500 Sighted BUTON ISLAND at range of 34 miles and BATOE ATA ISLAND at range of 22 miles.
- 0723 Changed course to 140° true, to clear BATOE ATA by 15 miles, and sighted large bombing plane on parallel course at estimated range of 10 miles (Plane contact number 6). "SD" radar out of commission.
- 0726 Bomber turned to head for C. PELIN, so submerged to 200 feet. Decided to remain submerged until "SD" radar repaired. Had straightened bent packing gland on C.T. hatch worm shaft, and this dive will give a check on whether this eliminates the jamming, which occurs when opening after a long dive.
- 1324 "SD" radar back in commission. Surfaced and continued patrol at 14 knots. Hatch opened perfectly. Decided to proceed to AMBON along shipping lane, maintaining continuous periscope and high lookout watch. Visibility remarkable.

Noon Position: Lat. $06^{\circ} - 42'$ S. Long. $122^{\circ} - 43'$ E.

November 9, 1943.

- 0439 Submerged. Made periodic "SD" radar and periscope observations.
- 0605 Surfaced. Resumed surface patrol with continuous periscope search enroute AMBON. Visibility unlimited.

November 9, 1943. (Cont'd).

- 1228 Sighted BURU ISLAND, distance 30 miles.
- 1306 Sighted possible smoke bearing 220° true, confirmed by O.O.D. Changed course to 220° true and increased speed to 18 knots.
- 1423 No further sign of smoke or masts. Smoke probably one of several small dark clouds on horizon. Resumed base course 035° true at 14 knots.
- 1600 Eighty-two miles from AMBON. Submerged to avoid possible sighting by planes from or returning to AMBON. Our sighting by aircraft in GULF of BONI on November 3rd may have had some connection with the complete absence of any shipping sighted there or at SALIER STRAIT so am making every effort to arrive off AMBON undetected.
- 1817 Surfaced in the clearest night and brightest moonlight any on board had ever seen. AMBON ISLAND visible in detail with naked eye at distance of 39 miles. AMBELAU ISLAND when abeam at range of 28 miles by radar and navigational fix was estimated to be from 6 to 10 miles away.

Patrolling near a port during full moon and freak visibility is against my better judgement as it affords no opportunities to get away on surface under cover of darkness if A/S vessels remain in vicinity. Two A/S and a plane could keep a submarine down, under these conditions of moon and visibility, for longer than we could stay down.

Noon Position: Lat. $04^{\circ} - 28.5'$ S. Long. $126^{\circ} - 38.6'$ E.

November 10, 1943.

Ran toward AMBON until twenty miles off, then patrolled on NW-SE line until 0300, when closed entrance to 8 miles and at -

- 0404 Submerged to 420 feet to check density and CAPELIN. Both excellent.

Patrolled into entrance until TG. ALANG bore 300° true. Nothing in sight in Bay, so continued patrol about 3 miles off entrance until noon, then began moving out on course 220° true.

- 1821 Surfaced 14 miles bearing 220° from AMBON BAY entrance. Patrol boat, similar to Eagle boat, bearing 250° relative, range about 8000 yards. (Ship contact #4).

November 10, 1942 (Cont'd)

1824 Submerged.

Her course plotted and tracked as 335° true, headed for MANIPA STRAIT. "SJ" radar unable to pick up target either on surface or at 40 feet, which is puzzling, since target clearly visible to well below deck line and our radar has been very sensitive for last ten days. Believe part of trouble is lack of training of operators.

1935 Surfaced, patrol boat out of sight.

Patrolled across traffic lanes 20 miles SW of AMBON.

Master gyro out of commission all day.

Noon Position: Lat. 03° - 50.2' S. Long. 127° - 55.0' E.

November 11, 1942.

0417 Submerged 7 miles off entrance to AMBON BAY and closed to 4 miles.

0550 Set course for KELING STRAIT.

1228 Sighted smoke bearing 332° true in KELING STRAIT (Ship contact number 5 Attack #1). Headed north to close target and at same time close probable track from STRAIT to coast of CERAM north of AMBON.

1332 Mast and stack of enemy sighted, farther east than expected. He had apparently hugged coast of KELING despite currents the Pilot warns of there. Would like to capture a Jap merchant skipper and keep him with us as official crystal ball gazer in all situations involving estimates of probable movements of Jap ships.

1400 Had closed range to about 4500 yards, with 3000 to track. Sea so glassy could use only inches of periscope and had to run at 150 feet between looks.

Target of such odd build that estimate of size, draft and mast or stack heights were very approximate.

1415:53 Fired first of four torpedoes. Checked bearing for second and fourth shots; observed and generated bearings right on.

1416:50 Fired fourth torpedo.

November 11, 1943 (Cont'd).

1418:38 Saw huge column of water rise about 150 feet in air in line with middle of target, but definitely on the far side. It was apparently under his bilge or close aboard him, as when Capt. Nichols took a look the column of water was falling on both sides of the target.

Two seconds or less after the first splash another column of water arose ahead of the target, and another heavy explosion was heard.

The second flash appeared to be between CAPELIN and enemy track, and leading him by the amount of spread between No. 3 and No. 4 torpedoes. It seems obvious that the fourth torpedo was countermined by the explosion of the third torpedo, despite the firing interval of 24 seconds and a spread of three degrees between these two torpedoes.

Torpedoes 1 and 2 exploded 5^m 40^s and 6^m 10^s after firing.

Was amazed to see the ship, which should have broken in two from a torpex hit under her middle, turn tail and head for the beach, apparently undamaged and at the same speed, 11 knots.

1434 Went to 150 feet to think this over and avoid any planes his radio might call over. Changed course to head for target.

1450 Came back to periscope depth. Target headed for beach about eight miles away, and opening range rapidly. No sign of damage other than that his stern seemed a bit low in the water. Turn count 140; it had been 124. Continued following target in toward the beach, watching carefully for AS vessels with periscope and for planes with "SD" radar.

1525 Target nearing beach, now definitely down by the stern a couple of feet, and listed to starboard five to ten degrees, but no evidence of serious damage.

1530 Target near sandy beach facing a group of native huts (Lat. 3° - 27' S. Long 127° - 54.40' E.). Down by the stern a bit more, but still had steam up. Several sailboats hovering about her.

Was convinced by this time that the first torpedo, which by an error had the same spread setting as the third, ran deep and failed to function by influence, while the third torpedo also passed under the target's middle but fired magnetically under or near the turn of the bilge on the opposite (port) side.

November 11, 1943 (Cont)

This explosion is believed to have been in effect a near miss which sprung her plates sufficiently to make the Japs try to beach her until temporary repairs could be accomplished, but not enough to get beyond control of his pumps. Unable to understand why No. 4 countermined nor why torpedoes set at 10 feet should go under a heavily laden vessel of this size.

1538 Decided to leave target and head for KELANG STRAIT to arrive at northern end by 2130. It was then an hour and twenty minutes after the attack, with the target only 22 miles from AMBON. Either air attacks or AS vessel activity seemed probable at any minute. Planned to look for him following night and gun him if still there.

1642 Noted that our non-sinkable target was now lying parallel to the beach, but not on it. She was on an even keel with steam up, but not moving. Still no sign of planes or AS vessels. Hated to let her get away from four torpedoes with only slight damage, and figured if AMBON hadn't received word of the attack by now they might not for another hour.

Accordingly, changed course to close target again. Range then 6000 yards by fix.

1723 Range 2000 yards. Ship had swung 90°, then 180°, presenting a convenient 90 starboard angle on bow. Could see two men in whites on the beach, and several men in whites on poop deck.

1735 Swung hard left to put her astern and at -

1739:30 Fired #10 tube. (Attack #2).

1741:02 Torpedo hit squarely in her center with a soul satisfying wallop. I had a momentary glimpse of a flash twice her height with an inverted V where her center had been, and pieces of wreckage and/or Japs silhouetted against the red flame, and then nothing but smoke. Native huts still visible. That hit will be the talk of those natives for generations, if it didn't kill them too.

It took five to get a ship worth only one or a gun attack but we got her, and the extras were worth their cost in morale effect on the crew and myself, to say nothing of Comsubdiv 162.

1824 Surfaced in bright moonlight. Nothing in sight.

Resumed course for KELANG STRAIT.

1841 Sighted ship or patrol vessel heading southeasterly from south end of MANIPA ISLAND. Radar picked it up immediately when put on the bearing, range 9000 yards, closing. Started tracking, (Ship contact number 6), bow on to enemy, moon directly astern.

November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)

- 1845 Range 6700 yards. Submerged to 40 feet. Target appeared to be small, but larger than an escort vessel.
- 1904 Target passed at 7000 yards. Unable to close submerged. Impossible to get ahead of him on surface before he reaches ALBON.
- 1955 Surfaced, headed into KELANG STRAIT.
- 2125 Rounded KELANG ISLAND and headed NE close to beach.
- 2143 Sighted freighter, angle on bow Zero. Moved closer to beach, then headed at her and began tracking. Radar unable to pick up target, so plainly visible (Ship contact number 7).
- 2150 Escort now visible off enemy starboard quarter. Still no radar contact.
- 2157 Dove to 40 feet. Radar apparently out, so went to 60 feet. Target plainly visible by periscope.

Note: Remainder of this encounter will be described in some detail, not from any exaggerated idea of its importance, but because so many of the subsequent events cannot be explained and it is felt that giving available data may enable others to solve the enigmas.

- 2224:04 Fired first of 4 torpedo spread from stern tubes, 110 port track. (Had reversed course when range, by eye, showed distance to track 700 yards. After getting around discovered this was mistake, as distance to track based on stadimeter range after turning was 1200 yards and beach very close ahead).
- 2225:20 Fired 4th torpedo and turned with everything we had toward escort.
- 2225:25 First torpedo hit. Saw no flash, but target, enveloped in black smoke, turned left and headed at CAPELIN and beach. Watched escort while waiting for other two hits which should be coming, as spread was 150 feet between torpedoes with first two to hit. The other three missed or ran under. Escort headed NW, then East, then SW, then at CAPELIN, showing bow wave, on port quarter of freighter.
- 2230 Two explosions. Sounded like torpedoes at end of run. Now had escort lined up for down throat shot. Range anybody's guess, but used 1000 yards.
- 2230:48 Heard explosion which every war patrol experienced man on ship swore was a torpedo and not a depth charge. Was watching freighter at this time. Thought sure we had hit escort but a quick look showed an escort still there,

November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)

large angle on bow, so unless he had two escorts we must have missed him. Time was nearly right and that did not sound like a depth charge or a premature. It probably hit the freighter, whose bearing at time of firing was only a few degrees left of escort with small starboard angle on bow, converging escort and closer to CAPELIN than was the escort.

As I swung left after firing at escort, freighter changed course to left about 70 degrees at very slow speed.

2236 Got lined up for straight stern shot, 90 starboard track but stern tube reload not completed. Was headed directly at beach, which filled periscope in high power.

2237 Depth charge. Escort beyond freighter.

2241 Fired #8 tube. Torpedo did not leave tube. Turned hard right to course 300° to clear beach. Made ready two bow tubes. Ordered stern tubes secured but after room reported could not close outer door on #8 as torpedo had moved beyond stop bolt.

Had very bad moment, with depth charges dropping, unable to close door on loaded tube, and knowing we would have to go deep soon.

2245 Fired #8 tube at beach to clear tube.

2247 Freighter having swung to give 90 port track, fired tubes 1 and 2. Escort on port quarter of freighter coming fast with port angle on bow, range about 1500 yards. I had intended to fire #1 at freighter and #2 at escort, but forgot to tell fire control party, so both were fired at freighter.

One hit 58 seconds later. Freighter screws stopped immediately.

2248 Went to 400 feet, turning right to avoid freighter. Two depth charges as we sent down.

2254:55 Sound man reported series of five "distant explosions". At same time a cracking and groaning noise was heard throughout ship. I ordered depth decreased to 200 feet and check made on sea pressure, as all hands thought the CAPELIN was cracking up or the Conning Tower was coming loose from the hull.

When sea pressure checked normal, realized it was freighter breaking up. She must have been less than 300 yards off my port beam then.

From 2300 to 2311 sound reported six weak explosions. Thirteen depth charges, making a total of sixteen, were dropped in next hour, none very close and several must have been over 2000 yards away.

November 11, 1943 (Cont'd)

Made three attempts to return to periscope depth, but bow planes had developed a bad rumble and every time we put them on rise the Jap dropped a charge within 30 seconds.

2354 Armistice Day Celebration, Jap version, ended.

November 12, 1943

0555 Surfaced and cleared area to westward. Nothing in sight.

0430 Submerged north of BURU ISLAND.

0820¹ Surfaced.

0824¹ Bomber on starboard beam heading in. (Plane contact No. 7)
Submerged to 150 feet.

1020¹ Surfaced. Rounded BURU ISLAND and headed south during remainder of day.

Noon Position: Lat. 02°-45' S. Long. 126° - 31.5 E.

November 13, 1943.

0430 Submerged.

0512 Surfaced.

0750 Began closing MORO MUHO ISLAND to try to tune "SJ" radar.

0853 Sighted auxiliary powered yawl on opposite (west) side of sand spit, and what appeared to be a lean-to on beach. On chance that this island, which is a possible turning point or landmark on routes from SURABAIK and SALLER STRAIT to AMBON and SORONG, may be manned by Jap coast watchers, decided to gun the yawl.

0916 Closing island from west. Had no chart of island and its reefs, so flooded down and echo ranged ahead. Yawl had moved to background of trees.

0943 "QC" showed reef 900 yards ahead. Believe it was deep reef, but took no chances, paralleled island and began firing 4" gun at Yawl at estimated range of 5000 yards. After several overs got a few sufficiently close to force crew to beach her and run for the bushes. Gun crew's performance and discipline rather poor, so at -

0950 Ceased firing, 12 rounds of common expended. No hits.

November 13, 1943

At least this showed us the gun crew is not as good as we thought after their excellent performance off Brisbane. Cleared to East until out of sight then headed SW along shipping lanes from KOMBA ISLAND to SORONG and AMBON.

At southern limit of area. Patrolled across shipping lanes on NW-SE line.

Noon position: Lat. $06^{\circ} - 13'$ S. Long. $124^{\circ} - 48.2$ E.

November 14, 1943.

Patrolling as before.

1046 Set course for Darwin, via east of WETAR, KISAR and TIMOR, in accordance with special instructions.

2048 Entered strait in bright moonlight.

November 15, 1943.

0300 Cleared strait, sent E.T.A. Darwin to C.T.F. 71
Zig Zaging at 14 knots.

0513 Sighted periscope on port beam. Put it astern and dove to 150 feet. No screws heard.

0555 Surfaced and cleared vicinity zipping every 2 minutes.

Noon Position: Lat. $10^{\circ} - 03.5$ S. Long $128^{\circ} - 16.0'$ E.

November 16, 1943.

0753(H) Arrived Port Darwin. Emergency repair force from the U.S.S. PELIAS commenced overhaul of bow planes, master gyro, upper conning tower hatch and "SJ" radar. Disassembled the conning tower hatch operating mechanism and replaced the burred worm shaft. Overhauled master gyro and replaced oscillator unit and one 4 m f condenser; added damping oil; and made a complete routine inspection of the master compass and follow-up panel. Overhauled and checked "SJ" Radar. The ship's force pulled and inspected main bearings on three main engines.

The Commanding Officer is concerned with unexpectedly high number of engine hours, due to the additional round trip area to Darwin. To date the number of miles steamed is as follows:

Darwin to Area:	340
In the Area:	3749
Area to Darwin:	503
Total	4592

The engine hours to date are as follows:
No. 1 M.E.: 1123; No. 2 M.E.: 773.3; No. 3 M.E.: 797.4;
No. 4 M.E. 1182.1; Aus.: 601.5. If the engine hours during the remainder of the patrol are in the same proportion to the days underway as during the period covered in this patrol report; it is believed that three and not two main engines will require overhaul during the forthcoming refit period.

PLANE CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Lat. & Long.	Type(s)	Initial Range	Est. course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1	1021(I) 31 Oct. 1943	08°-13'S 127°-10'E	Bomber	7 miles	130° T.; 190 knots.	P	Appeared to be patrolling WETAR PASSAGE.
2	1045(I) 31 Oct. 1943	08°-13'S 127°-09	Bomber	5 miles	300° T.; 190 knots.	F	Believed to be same plane sighted in contact #1, patrolling WETAR PASSAGE.
3	1840(H) 3 Nov. 1943	05°-30'S 120°-47'E		5 miles	290° T.; 300 knots.	LS	This plane may have been furnishing air coverage for the AK Capelin had been chasing.
4	0708(H) 4 Nov. 1943	04°-09'S 121°-21'E	Bomber	10 miles	000° T.; 200 knots.	P	
5	0635(H) 7 Nov. 1943	05°-41'S 120°-33'E		18 miles		R	
6	0723(H) 8 Nov. 1943	06°-35'S 122°-35'E	Bomber	19 miles	140° T.; 200 knots.	LS	Plane turned and headed for CAPELIN; dived to 200 ft.
7	0824(H) 12 Nov. 1943	02°-45'S 126°-50'E	Bomber	5 miles	180° T.; 250 knots.	LS	Plane headed for CAPELIN; dived to 150 feet.

P - Periscope, submerged
R - SD Indar
LS - Lookout, surface.

O. Time Date	Type(s)	Initial		Est. Course		How Contacted	Remarks.
		Range	Lat. & Long.	Speed			
1 3 Nov. '43	AK Large	36,000 yards	04° - 57' S. 121° - 34' E.	2350 T.; 12 knots		P	Smoke was sighted as the target passed close aboard the N.W. coast of KABAENA IS. Unable to close target.
2 2136(H)	DD or PC	16,000 yards	05° - 42' S. 120° - 36' E.	0500 T.; 9 knots.		SN	Target disappeared with SAILER IS. in the back-ground.
3 1436(H)	AK, small or Tug.	10,000 yards.	05° - 40' S. 120° - 31' E.	1700 T.; 6 knots.		P	Target was too small for a Torpedo.
4 1821(H)	PC	8000 yards.	03° - 55' S. 127° - 49' E.	3350 T.; 10 knots.		SN	Smoke was sighted 64 minutes before the target was sighted. Target was sunk.
5 1228(H)	AK	30,000 yards	03° - 27' S. 127° - 44' E.	1520 T.; 10.5 knots		P	Smoke was sighted 64 minutes before the target was sighted. Target was sunk.
6 1841(H)	PC or DD	9,000 yards	03° - 21' S. 127° - 49' E.	1450 T.; 15 knots		SN	Unable to close range below 6700 yards.
7 2143(H)	AK, P.C.	14,000 yards	03° - 11' S. 127° - 37' E.			SN	Sunk AK; was mildly depth charged by the PC boat.

P - Periscope.
SN - Surface, night.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 1.
Time 1416(H) Date Nov. 11, 1943 Lat. 3°-25' S. Long. 127°-46.4' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Had stick mast well forward, unusually long forecastle piled high with crates or lumber, small composite superstructure about two thirds his length from bow, and poop deck almost as high as bridge. Flying Jap merchant flag at stern. No sign of any gun armament.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) One, tonnage estimated 2500 to 3000 tons.
Damaged:-

Damage

Determined by: Ship tried (unsuccessfully) to beach herself.
Listed slightly and down by stern.

Target draft: 15 Ft. Course: 152° T. Speed: 10.5 Kts. Range: Act. 3100 Est. 2350

Own Ship Data

Speed 4 kts. Course: 090° T. Depth: 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

Day periscope. Glassy sea. Range data very rough. Masthead height used was 90 feet. Torpedo run indicates mast was higher, yet ship of this size shouldn't have much higher mast. Tried "QC" range at 2500 yards without success.

Later events proved this should have been gun attack

Would have used white light method spread, but haven't drilled at using this with Mk. 3 T.D.C., and sea so smooth I couldn't use long exposures this method requires except after considerable drill.

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2. PATROL NO. 1

TIME: 1740(H) DATE: Nov. 11, 43 Lat: 3° - 27.2 S. Long: 127°-52.4 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Had stick mast well forward; unusually long forecastle piled high with crates or lumber, small composite superstructure about two thirds his length from bow, and poop deck almost as high as bridge. Flying Jap merchant flag at stern. No sign of any gun armament.

Ship(s) Sunk: One, Tonnage estimated 2500 to 3000 tons.

Damage

Determined by: Saw ship disintegrate.

Target draft: 15ft. Course: 165° T. Speed 0 RANGE 1600 Yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed 3 kts. Course: 265° Depth: 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack:

Night periscope attack, straight stern shot at stopped target, using T.D.C. to take care of any variations of our course.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 1.

TIME 2225(H) DATE: 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3° - 08.5 S. Long. 127°-37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Maierform bow, well decked, mast funnel mast. Composite superstructure. Heavy stick masts. No kingposts seen. Looked modern. Similar to those shown page 135 of Recognition Manual. Tonnage estimated at 3500 to 4000, but reported to be 3300. Contact made by visual sighting.

Ship(s) Sunk None.

Ship(s) Damaged One. AK as described above.

Damage

Determined by: Target enveloped in black smoke, turned left and headed at CAPELIN and beach.

Target draft 15 ft. Course 242° T. Speed 9 knots Range 1800

Own Ship Data

Speed 3.5 knots Course 117° swinging to 102° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle .

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight periscope attack. Radar out of commission. Gyro oscillation motor out, and gyro lagged on turns, which may have accounted for some of the misses, since gyro error was variable. Made a serious error in not using white light method spread, which is independent of range for straight shots, instead of spread table, since I had no means of determining range with any accuracy until target close enough to get rough stadimeter range. Checked bearing for each shot. Set up checked perfectly.

Made another error in firing fourth torpedo after holding it up for 50 seconds while turning for zero gyro angle. Didn't realize I had held it that long.

Did not try echo range because of escort and because "QC" failed to get range on target that afternoon.

CONFIDENTIALATTACK NO. 1ATTACK NO. 2
(Same target as
attack No. 1).

	<u>No. 1</u>	<u>NO. 2</u>	<u>No. 3</u>	<u>No. 4</u>	<u>No. 10</u>
Tubes fired:	No. 1	NO. 2	No. 3	No. 4	No. 10
Track angle:	110 S	110 S	110 S	110 S	100 S
Gyro angle:	346.5	347	352	350.5	180
Depth set:	10 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.	6 ft.
Power:	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss:	Miss	Miss	Hit	Countermined	Hit
Erratic:	Ran deep? No	No	Ran deep? No	No	No
Serial No.	25236	39398	22204	25375	22489
Mk. Torpedo:	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Mk. Exploder:	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A
Serial No.	--	--	--	--	--
Actuation Set:	C & M	C & M	C & M	C & M	C & M
Actuation Actual:	End of run		M	M	C
Mark Warhead:	16	16	16	16	16
Serial No:	--	--	--	--	--
Explosive:	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx
Firing Interval:	0	23"	10"	24"	--
Type spread:	Divergent spread covering 450 feet at 2400 yards.				
Sea Conditions:	Calm				Calm
Overhaul Activity:	U.S.S. FULTON				U.S.S. FULTON
Remarks:	No. 3 evidently fired by influence, definitely on far side of target while No. 4 was countermined on near side of target. No. 1 was set with same spread as No. 3, so probably ran under target without exploding.				

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 1

TIME 2230 (H) DATE 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3° - 08.5 S. Long. 127° - 37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Small escort. No details noted except that was about size of "PC" boat.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged: Missed small escort vessel but hit AK tonnage reported to be 3300 (Same vessel as described in torpedo attack #3).

Damage
Determined by: Explosion was definitely a torpedo hit and not a depth charge. Freighter was converging escorts' track at half the escort's range from CAPELIN, and bearing only a few degrees to left of escort at time of firing. Immediately after explosion, AK swung left 70 degrees then right 180 degrees, and slowed appreciably.

Target draft 12 ft. COURSE 135° T. SPEED 15 kts RANGE 1000 yds.

Own ship data.

Speed 4 knots Course 320° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight night periscope attack, intended as "down the throat" shot, but target changed course slightly just before firing. Possibly should have waited until gyro angle was zero instead of 10 left, but then track would have increased. Still think I would have hit him if the freighter hadn't stopped it.

CONFIDENTIALATTACK NO. 3

	No. <u>7</u>	No. <u>8</u>	No. <u>9</u>	No. <u>10</u>
Tubes Fired -				
Track Angle -	110 P	112 P	114 P	120 P
Gyro Angle -	200	198	198	195
Depth set -	10 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.
Power:-	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss -	Hit	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic -	No	No	No	No
Mk. Torpedo -	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No. -	25378	25275	39305	22511
Mark Exploder	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A
Serial No. -				12286
Actuation Set -	C & M	C & M	C & M	C & M
Actuation Actual -	C	End of run.	End of run.	End of run.
Mark Warhead -	16	16	16	16
Serial No. -				5380
Explosive -	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx
Firing Interval -	0	15"	13"	57"
Type Spread:	Divergent. 1° L., 1° R., 2° L., 2° R.			
Sea Conditions -	Calm	Calm	Calm	Calm
Overhaul Activity.-	U.S.S. FULTON.			
Remarks -	With spread used if either of 1st two torpedoes hit, one or two of others should have hit also.			

<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>	<u>ATTACK #4</u>	<u>ATTACK #5</u>		<u>ATTACK #6</u>
	No. 5	No. 1	No. 2	No. 8
Tubes Fired -				
Track Angle-	13 S	120 P	120 P	--
Gyro Angle-	10	353	351	200
Depth set-	6 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.	10 ft.
Power-	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss-	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic - (yes or No)	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo-	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	39401	24325	17281	25358
Mark Exploder-	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A	6-1A
Serial No.-	--	12526	12451	12516
Actuation Set-	C & M	C & M	C & M	C & M
Actuation Actual-	M	C	Miss	--
Mark Warhead-	15-1	16	15	16
Serial No.-	--	10103	11029	3852
Explosive-	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx	Tpx
Firing Interval-	--	0	11"	--
Type spread-	None	None	None	--
Sea Conditions-	Calm	Calm	Calm	Calm
Overhaul Activity-	USS FULTON	U.S.S. FULTON		USS FULTON

REMARKS: Attack #5. None.

Remarks: Attack #4-- This torpedo fired at PC escort. Explosion heard 33 seconds after firing.

Remarks: Attack # - Attempted to fire with no impulse air built up in impulse bottle. The residual air (less than 50 psi.) from previous firing moved torpedo aft 1 or 2 inches, not enough to trip starting lever, but too far to insert gyro spindle or drop stop bolt forward of guide stud again. The stop bolt rod thus could not be withdrawn to allow tube "READY TO FIRE" interlock to be thrown to "MUZZLE DOOR UNLOCKED" position. The outer door could not be closed for this reason.

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS239) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. 1

TIME 2247(H) DATE: 11 Nov. 1943 Lat. 3°-08.5 S. Long. 127°-37.8 E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: AK - Maierform bow, well decked, mast funnel mast. Composite superstructure. Heavy stick masts. No kingposts seen. Looked modern. Similar to those shown page 135 of Recognition Manual. Tonnage estimated at 3500 to 4000, but reported to be 3300. Contact made by visual sighting.

Ship(s) Sunk One AK as described above.

Ship(s) Damaged:

Damage

Determined by: Ship apparently lost steering control after hit by torpedo fired at escort. Screws stopped immediately after hit made in this attack, and 6 minutes after this hit cracking up noises were heard through the hull so plainly all hands thought CAPELIN had exceeded test depth and was breaking up. Five internal explosions at this time and six more 6 to 17 minutes later.

Target Draft 15 ft. Course 234° T. Speed 5 kts. Range 900 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed 4.5 kts. Course 300° T. Depth 65 ft. Angle 0

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Moonlight periscope attack. Radar out of commission. Gyro oscillation motor out, and gyro lagged on turns, which may have accounted for some of the misses, since gyro error was variable. Made a serious error in not using white light method spread, which is independent of range for straight shots, instead of spread table, since I had no means of determining range with any accuracy until target close enough to get rough stadimeter range. Checked bearing for each shot. Set up checked perfectly.

This attack was probably not necessary, as one hit would have sunk this ship eventually. Did not know then that torpedo fired at escort had hit freighter, and wanted to see the freighter sink before I had to go deep. I don't like "damaged" ships.

FC5-16/A16-3

(1/Wn)

SUBMARINE SQUADRON SIXTEEN

Serial #012

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War Patrol
SS289/A16-3 dated 17
November 1943.

U.S.S. RASHER, Flagship,
5 January 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron SIXTEEN.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.


Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comments on.

1. The first war patrol of the CAPELIN covered a period of seventeen days of which fifteen days were spent in enemy controlled waters or in assigned areas. Coverage in the time available was thorough.

2. The attack opportunities presented were exploited to the maximum and the attacks well executed. The torpedo performance apparently was below average, although conclusive evidence to this effect is lacking.

3. The defects enumerated were corrected as indicated on page 16 of the report by the emergency repair force of the U.S.S. PELIAS. The noisy operation of the bow planes was determined to be due to lack of adequate lubrication and means to provide it in the future were installed during the brief refit period.

4. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the CAPELIN are congratulated upon the completion of this short but successful first war patrol.


J. H. HAINES.

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

12-ms

Serial 048

15 January, 1944.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War
Patrol Report SS289/
A16-3 dated 17
November, 1943.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comments on.

1. The CAPELIN, in compliance with orders, returned to DARWIN before completion of a full length patrol to effect repairs and disembark the Commander Submarine Division ONE-SIXTY-TWO. Paragraphs 'I' to 'U', inclusive, were not submitted with the report.

2. This short period in assigned operating areas was replete with activity. The Commanding Officer's aggressiveness and resolute determination to attack and completely destroy all enemy vessels encountered is noted with pleasure. CAPELIN very thoroughly patrolled all probable locations of enemy shipping.

3. This patrol is considered successful for award of the Submarine Combat Insignia.



- 1 -

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

12-ms

Serial 048

15 January, 1944.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS CAPELIN First War
Patrol Report SS289/A16-3
dated 17 November, 1943.

Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comments on.

4. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the CAPELIN on this effective short First War Patrol in which the following damage was inflicted on the enemy:

SUNK

1 - AK (KIDNETAMA MARU) 3,360 Tons.
1 - AK (Unidentified) 4,000 "

TOTAL 7,360 Tons.

DISTRIBUTION

R. W. CHRISTIE.

Cominch	(2)- Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav	(1)- Via Com7thFlt
Vice Opnav	
Op-23c	(1)
Com1stFlt	(1)
Com2ndFlt	(1)
Com3rdFlt	(1)
Com7thFlt	(1)
Comsub1stFlt	(2)
Comsub2ndFlt	(4)
Comtaskfor-72	(2)
Comtaskfor-71	(4)
Comsubron-16	(1)
Divecoms Ron-16	(1)
Each S/M W.A.	(1) - <u>NOT TO BE TAKEN TO SEA - BURN.</u>

B. L. Carr
B. L. CARR,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.

F4253

File No 587

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(F-3/roj)

Serial: 0163

24 JAN 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
CAPELIN First War
Patrol Report SS289/
Al6-3 dated 17 November,
1943.

From: Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) - Report of First War
Patrol.
1. Forwarded.

R. H. Cruzen
R. H. CRUZEN
By direction.

Copy to:
VCNO

FILMED

31

UNITED STATES SUBMARINE LOSSES

WORLD WAR II

Reissued with an Appendix of
Axis Submarine Losses, fully indexed,

by

Naval History Division
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington: 1963

CAPELIN (SS 289)


Returning from her first war patrol after only 17 days out, CAPELIN (Cdr. E. E. Marshall) came into Darwin 16 November 1943 with a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy bow planes, and a defective radar tube. These flaws were corrected to the satisfaction of the Commanding Officer, and the ship then departed for her second patrol on 17 November. Her area was in the Molukka and Celebes seas, and she was to pay particular attention to Kaoe Bay, Morotai Strait, Davao Gulf and trade routes in the vicinity of Siaoe, Sangi, Talaud and Sarangani Islands. She was to leave her area at dark 6 December.


Nothing has been positively heard from CAPELIN since she departed. However, BONEFISH reported having seen a U. S. submarine at 1°-14'N, 123°-50'E on 2 December 1943. This position is in the area assigned to CAPELIN at this time. An attempt to reach CAPELIN by radio, on 9 December 1943, elicited no response.

On 23 November an American submarine was attacked off Kaoe Bay, Halmahera, 1°-34'N, 123°-07'E. However, the Japanese state that this attack was broken off, and the evidence of contact was rather thin. The only positive statement which can be made is that CAPELIN was lost in Celebes Sea, or in Molukka Passage or the Molukka Sea, probably in December 1943. Enemy minefields are now known to have been placed in various positions along the north coast of Celebes in CAPELIN's area, and she may have been lost because of a mine explosion. In her 17-day first patrol, CAPELIN sank two Japanese medium freighters for 7,400 tons of merchant shipping. This first patrol was conducted among the islands immediately west of New Guinea.



E. E. Marshall





U. S. S. CAPELIN (SS-289)

Name	Rate	Name	Rate
ARNEY, Buford Y	S2	MADDOX, John W	S1
BALL, Clarence M.	SM2	MADEY, Alfred	EM1
BECK, Claude I., Jr.	CTM	MARSHALL, Elliot E	LCDR--CO
BLAIR, Gerald R	EM3	MASON, William B., Jr	LCDR
BRAGG, Perry C.	QM3	MELVIN, George R	S1
BRITTON, Richard L	LTJG	MOELLER, Otto F	TM2
BROWN, Ellis S., Jr	S1	MORGAN, Henry F	RM1
BUTLER, Marcy H	CRM	NORRIS, Elmer A	F1
CALLAHAN, Foster T	CY	NOVOTNY, Cyril R	EM1
CALLAHAN, John J., Jr.	MoMM2	O'DONNELL, Melvin B	RM3
CAVANAUGH, Joseph P	S1	OLSEN, Stanley R	MoMM1
CHEATHAM, Earl	StM1	O'NEAL, Thomas E	TM2
CLIFFORD, Everett R	TM2	O'NEIL, Clinton F	LTJG
COLYER, Charles W	TM1	PERRY, Finon	StM2
CROSS, Joe L	MM1	PETTIGREW, Herman E, Jr	MoMM1
CROWLEY, James D	F2	PILKINGTON, William N	RT2
DE FREYAS, Charles F	EM3	POWELL, Richard	MoMM1
DEVINE, William F	TM3	RAMINSKI, William E	MoMM2
DEVINE, William J	TM2	RHIMANN, R. C.	LTJG
DILL, Paul L	TM3	RHODES, John E., Jr	MoMM2
EKLUND, Lester T	FC3	ROBERTS, Claude W	MoMM1
EVERHART, Charles L	PhM1	ROBERTSON, Edward D	LCDR--XO
GANLEY, John F., Jr	CMoMM	SHARER, Walter A	LT
GILLEN, Philip J	MoMM2	SIMON, Harry	GM1
GRABNICKAS, Peter	SC2	SMITH, D. T.	MoMM2
HICKS, Melvin J	EM2	SMITH, Leon C.	MoMM2
HOLT, James W., Jr	CEM	SMITH, Robert L	RM2
JACOBS, Dick	F1	SMOLENSKI, Edward	S1
KEATON, Leyle O	TM3	SNYDER, Norman W	F3
KENNEDY, D. G., Jr	EM1	STASIK, Walter W.	MoMM2
KLEIN, Isidore I	EM2	STEEGE, Erwin H	TM1
KOZIOL, John W	F3	STICKLE, Robert G	EM3
KRALL, Eugene J.	EM1	TERRELL, Robert W.	MoMM2
LAFFERTY, William A	S1	THIBEAULT, Jerry L	TM3
LANDRES, L. A.	CMoMM	UHLMANN, Roy C	LT
LANGE, Donald W	S1	VASSAR, Curtis L., Jr	SC1
LESTER, Edwin J	MoMM1	VAUGHAN, Charles W	S1
LEWITT, William M	EM2	WELLMAN, Ernest E	F1
LUTLEY, John L	F2	WINKLER, Herman R., Jr	QM3

FE24-71/A17-25

UNITED STATES NAVY

Mk.

Serial 00111

S-E-C-R-E-T

DECLASSIFIED

10 APR 1944

From: The Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
To : The Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: Record of Proceedings of an Investigation convened by the Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet, to inquire into the possible loss of the U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289) on her second war patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Original and two copies of subject investigation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

R. W. Christie
R. W. CHRISTIE.

Com 7th Fleet Box # 53944 RS # FILE A17 JACKET # NB


SECRET

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
OF A
BOARD OF INVESTIGATION
CONVENED AT THE
HEADQUARTERS OF
COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET
BY ORDER OF
COMMANDER SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET

To inquire into the circumstances connected with
the possible loss of the U.S.S. Capelin on
her second war patrol

March 3, 1944

A true copy. Attest:


C. S. Isgrig,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Investigating Officer.

SECRET

FE24-71/A17-25

UNITED STATES NAVY

Mk.

Serial 00111

S-E-C-R-E-T

10 APR 1944

From: The Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
To : The Commander Seventh Fleet.
Subject: Record of Proceedings of an Investigation
convened by the Commander Submarines, Seventh
Fleet, to inquire into the possible loss of
the U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS239) on her second war
patrol.
Enclosure: (A) Original and two copies of subject
investigation.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

R. W. CHRISTIE.

FE24-71/A17-25

SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET

Mk.

Serial 00112

U.S.S. BONEFISH (SS223), Flagship,

8 April 1944.

S-E-C-R-E-T

The proceedings, findings, and recommendation of the investigation in the attached case are approved.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.

SECRET

Finding of Facts

1. That the U.S.S. Capelin departed from Darwin, Australia on her first war patrol on 30 October 1943.
2. That she returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943 because of a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy bow planes and defective radar tube, all of which developed during her first patrol.
3. That the derangements were corrected to the satisfaction of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Capelin, and that the ship then departed on her second patrol at about 1930 on 17 November 1943.
4. That nothing further has positively been seen nor heard of the U.S.S. Capelin since that date. The U.S.S. Bonerfish upon return from her second war patrol, reported, that at 1753 (H), 2 December, in latitude 10° - 10' N, longitude 123° - 50' E, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of about four miles. This was in the area to which the Capelin was assigned. There are indications of the activity of the Capelin which for security reasons, cannot be divulged.
5. That one attempt to communicate with the Capelin by radio from Headquarters, Commander Task Force Seventy-One on 9 December 1943, elicited no response nor acknowledgement.
6. That the operation order and annexes thereto, under which she was conducting her patrol were clear and complete.
7. That her assigned route, to and from her operating area, was enemy controlled, but was not considered particularly hazardous, nor was her operating area itself considered unduly dangerous.
8. That all friendly forces were adequately informed concerning her routing, and that so far as is known, the U.S.S. Bonerfish is the only friendly unit which made visual or other contact with a submarine in these areas during the period under question.
9. That the Commanding Officer was courageous and very aggressive, that his competence as a submarine captain was outstanding.
10. That the officers and men were very well trained, and the ship well handled, both surface and submerged. It was considered well above average from this standpoint.
11. That the material condition of the Capelin upon departure on her second war patrol was generally excellent, no defects were known to exist, and both the Commanding Officer and the Division Commander were satisfied that the Capelin was in all respects ready for the next patrol.
12. That there was nothing, other than the normal hazards of aggressive contacts with a formidable enemy, which could explain her failure to return.

SECRET

Recommendation

From a thorough examination of documents appended, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, intelligence information which does not appear, and from testimony adduced, it is not considered that any steps to improve current operational procedures, as carried out by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, are indicated.

SUBMARINES SEVENTH FLEET

FE24-71/A17-25

U.S.S. Bonefish (SS223), Flagship.

Serial 0065

25 FEB 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.
To : Captain Clayton S. Isgrig, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Orion.
Subject: Investigation into the possible loss of the
U.S.S. Capelin (SS289) on her second war patrol.

1. Under authority of 5 U.S. Code 93, you are hereby detailed to investigate, as soon as practicable, into the circumstances connected with the possible loss of the U.S.S. Capelin on her second war patrol.
2. You will make a thorough investigation into all the known circumstances connected with the operation of the Capelin during her second war patrol and submit a complete report to the Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet, of the facts which you deem to be established, together with recommendations as to what steps, if any, should be taken to improve operational procedures.
3. Your attention is particularly invited to Section 734, Naval Courts and Boards.
4. You will furnish your own clerical assistance. You are directed to make only four copies of the record of the proceedings and forward all four copies to the convening authority.

R. W. CHRISTIE,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Submarines, Seventh Fleet.

SECRET

First Day

U.S.S. Orion,
Friday, March 3, 1944.

The investigating officer, Captain Clayton S. Isgrig, U.S. Navy, administered the prescribed oath to Jacob Rosen, chief yeoman (permanent appointment), U.S. Navy, the reporter, who took seat as such.

The investigating officer read the order directing him to make the investigation and which is hereto prefixed.

The investigating officer announced that the investigation would be conducted with closed doors.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the investigation were present.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Murray J. Tichenor, Captain, U.S. Navy, Operations Officer, Staff, Commander Submarines, 7th Fleet.

2.Q. At the time that the U.S.S. Capelin departed on patrol were you the Operations Officer?

A. Yes, I was.

3.Q. Will you please produce the Operation Order and such other directives as you may have which were given the Capelin for this patrol?

Witness produced the Operation Order and two despatches, copies of which are appended.

A. There were only two despatches, other than intelligence, that were sent to the Capelin during this patrol.

4.Q. Referring to Commander Task Force 71 despatch 091440 of December 1943, what does "HARDIN LUCAS MARSHALL" refer to?

A. The names, "HARDIN LUCAS MARSHALL", refer to the names of the commanding officers of three submarines then on patrol, namely "TUNA", "BILLYFISH", and "CAPELIN", respectively.

5.Q. Was there any other information furnished this submarine prior to departure on this patrol?

A. The first patrol of the Capelin was terminated by orders to return to Darwin. Orders for the second patrol were promulgated by mailgram modifying original orders as issued for the first patrol. In addition to the modified despatch, orders referred to, the Capelin had annexes to her original operational order which included latest intelligence information of the areas she was to patrol. No other instructions were delivered to her.

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6.Q. Was Captain Nichols, Commander Submarines, 7th Fleet Staff, with the Capelin prior to the subject patrol?

A. Captain Nichols was in the Capelin during her first patrol, from departure Darwin to its return and termination at Darwin. This in accordance with orders issued by Commander Task Force 71.

7.Q. Was Captain Nichols given any information to transmit to the Capelin, other than intelligence information, which does not appear?

A. To my knowledge, he was not.

8.Q. How many war patrols did the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Capelin make, prior to this departure on patrol?

A. Our records indicate that the Commanding Officer made the third war patrol of the U.S.S. Cuttlefish and the first patrol of the U.S.S. Capelin, as Commanding Officer.

9.Q. Can you state what the state of training and morale of officers and crew of the Capelin was?

A. No sir, I cannot.

10.Q. Will you give a general description of the area in which the submarine was to operate, and the waters adjacent, with particular reference to the depths of water and areas which might be mineable?

A. The orders for the Capelin directed that she depart Darwin and proceed via Timor Sea and to patrol Banda Sea, Molukka Sea, Molukka Passage, and Celebes Sea Areas. These waters are considered enemy controlled. They are, in general, deep water areas. Previous patrol reports for these areas have indicated that they are quite extensively patrolled by both surface and air craft, and that they present the ever present navigational hazards. Waters in these areas through which the Capelin was directed to operate, are not considered mineable, except in very close approaches to land.

11.Q. Was the Capelin given any special instructions concerning her surface and submerged operations?

A. To my knowledge, she was given no special instructions as to how to conduct her patrol in regard to surface or submerged operations, other than the standing instructions contained in Commander Task Group 71.1 Operation Plan #1-43.

12.Q. As Operations Officer of this Task Force, you have knowledge of the despatches sent to the Capelin. Will you please give the dates and times when despatches were sent or received from the Capelin?

A. I have no information of any communication being received from the Capelin after her departure Darwin on patrol.

13.Q. Have you any knowledge of any Allied submarines, aircraft, or surface craft, which might have been operating in the area assigned to the Capelin for this patrol?

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A. I have no knowledge of any Allied aircraft or surface craft operating in her assigned area. Submarines of this force might be routed through areas designated for patrol by the Capelin while she was in the area. Information of this nature would normally be sent to submarines concerned, and I am sure was so done in this case. The U.S.S. Bonefish, upon return from her second war patrol, reported that at 1733(H), 2 December 1943, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of about 4 miles. This position was reported to be 1°10' N, 123°50' E. This position was in the area to which the Capelin was assigned.

14.Q. In issuing the Operation Order to the Capelin, were you assisted by any other officers, if so, whom?

A. I do not recall, whether or not, I was assisted by Commander Jensen, the Assistant Operations Officer for Submarines. The normal procedure is that the original operation order is drafted by the Assistant Operations Officer for Submarines. This operation order must then be approved by me, by the Chief of Staff, and the order signed by the Task Force Commander.

15.Q. Can you furnish any other information which would be helpful in investigating the possible loss of the Capelin?

A. I have no information received from the Capelin since her departure Darwin for patrol. There are indications of the activity of the Capelin, which for security reasons, I am not permitted to divulge. The Capelin was directed by her orders to depart her area at dark 8 December 1943, and return to Fremantle. She was thus expected back in Fremantle on or about 15 December 1943. On 9 December 1943, having heard nothing from her, we so phrased a part of a serial despatch which would encourage her to open up on her radio, namely, "IF PRUDENT GIVE ONE WORD REPORT NUMBER TORPEDOES REMAINING". No reply was received to this despatch. On 20 December 1943, we reported by despatch to Commander 7th Fleet, that the Capelin was overdue.

Witness produced this despatch, copy of which is appended.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Captain P.G. Nichols, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff, Commander Submarines 7th Fleet, formerly Commander Submarine Division 123.

2.Q. Can you tell me what you might consider pertinent

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information concerning the material condition of the hull, state of training and the morale of the officers and crew of the U.S.S. Capelin during her first war patrol?

A. On or about 27 October 1943, I was directed to proceed to the port in which the U.S.S. Capelin might be, and embark in the Capelin for a special mission and a war patrol. I was on the Capelin for about 19 days. During this period she patrolled in the Flores, Banda, and Serang Seas. I considered the Capelin to be in excellent material condition, the only casualties during the period I was in the ship were defective tubes in the SJ Radar, a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, and excessively noisy bow planes. The casualty to the hatch mechanism occurred early in the patrol and was repaired by the ship's force. It recurred frequently during the patrol and was embarrassing. The other casualties occurred later in the patrol and prior to my disembarkation. The casualties were reported to Commander Task Force 71, who ordered a repair group to the port of arrival. This group made complete and satisfactory repairs prior to departure on her second war patrol. I observed the Capelin from a material and personnel aspect very closely during the time I was on her. I considered her to be well above average as regards material and training. While I was in the Capelin, she made two attacks on single ships, both of which were successful, and both were sunk. The Commanding Officer was very aggressive, and I considered him to be a most competent submarine captain. In one attack, the enemy was escorted, and the Capelin was subjected to depth charging for about three hours. The attack was made on a bright moonlight night from periscope and radar depth. One hit was obtained on the first salvo, and the enemy attempted to make the beach, which was about two miles distant. In spite of the escort, who was dropping depth charges, the Commanding Officer remained at periscope depth, continued attacking until the ship was sunk, and not until then did he take the Capelin deep, and commence evasive tactics. The evasive tactics were very skillful and in about three hours he evaded the escort, surfaced and cleared the area. It was during this action that the excessively noisy bow planes became evident. Although one depth charge was fairly close, no damage was sustained.

3.Q. You indicate that the Capelin had suffered casualties to bow planes and conning tower hatch which made continued submerged operations hazardous. On completion of repairs and prior to departure on her second war patrol, were these repaired in a fully satisfactory manner?

A. Yes. The trouble of the bow planes was only a matter of poor lubrication. A new greasing line was installed. The conning tower hatch casualty was caused by a badly burred worm shaft gear, which was replaced. The defective tubes in the SJ Radar were replaced. All repairs were inspected and tested in the presence of the Commanding Officer and myself, and we were satisfied that the Capelin was in all respects ready for the next patrol.

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4.Q. With regard to the operation order of the Capelin, did there appear any doubt in the mind of the Commanding Officer?

A. I received the Capelin's operation order from Commander Task Force 71 and delivered it to the Commanding Officer, Capelin. I went into and through it with the Commanding Officer, Capelin, and there was doubt in his mind as to it.

5.Q. Was there anything in connection with your association with the Capelin which would explain her failure to return from this patrol?

A. No.

6.Q. Will you state the departure and arrival dates of the U.S.S. Capelin from and to Darwin on her first war patrol?

A. The Capelin departed Darwin on 30 October 1943, and returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943.

7.Q. When did she leave Darwin on her second war patrol?

A. She departed Darwin about 1930 on 17 November 1943.

8.Q. Are there any other facts concerning this investigation which you care to set forth?

A. No, except to state that the Commanding Officer, Capelin, was a outstanding, aggressive, and courageous officer. His officers and men were very well trained, his ship was well handled, both surface and submerged.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The investigation was adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

SECRET

Second Day

U.S.S. Orion,
Saturday, March 4, 1944.

At 10 a.m.

A witness called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation and declared as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1.Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Edward S. Carnick, Commander, U.S. Navy, Commanding Submarine Repair Unit, Navy 137.

2.Q. Can you tell me what you may consider pertinent information concerning the U.S.S. Capelin during your association with her, on or about 17 November 1943?

A. The repairs that I was concerned with, which were actually performed by a group of men directed by Lieutenant (junior grade) Kirkpatrick, and Electrician Burkett, were as follows:

- (a) minor repairs to and adjustments to master gyro compass.
- (b) Adjustments and replacement of a minor part of the SJ Radar.
- (c) Noisy bow planes, noise appeared in the lower universal, and was corrected by installing separate grease fittings.
- (d) Repairs of faulty dogs on upper conning tower hatch. Sectors and worm shaft were taken from a submarine present in Fremantle, but only one part was finally used, and that was the worm shaft, inasmuch as it was found that the two holes in the sectors taken up as replacements had a different distance between centers. After placing a new worm shaft in the hatch and stoning off burrs on other parts and adjusting parts of the linkage, the operation of the hatch was made satisfactory to the ship's officers, who conducted a series of tests on opening and closing it.
- (e) Just prior to sailing, ship's force discovered several large holes in the main engine exhaust piping outboard of the pressure hull. One of these was very close to the #4 main engine muffler, and was a hole of about 2 1/2" x 2". The repair of this hole by welding a scrap of mild steel plate by a welder loaned by the R.A.N. was accomplished.

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In regard to the general condition of the ship, as noted by myself, on several trips through the ship, my impression was that she was well cared for and maintained by her officers and crew.

3.Q. Were post-repair tests made to determine the successful completion of the repairs, and to ensure the ship's full military and material availability for combat operations?

A. I can answer your question only insofar as the repairs needed were made. Tests were made, at the dock, to determine the sufficiency of the repairs made by the repair party. Bow planes were operated for a long period of time, from hard rise to hard dive, after fitting the separate grease line, and were very quiet and satisfactory to the Commanding Officer. On the conning tower hatch, various officers from the Capelin, operated the conning tower hatch in a series of test exercises, simulating diving operations, and accepted the repairs as satisfactory. The SJ Radar after repairs, gave satisfactory ranges and bearings on various land objects in Darwin Harbor. The master gyro compass, after adjustments were made, gave satisfactory azimuths prior to sailing.

4.Q. Was the hydraulic system, to your knowledge, satisfactory?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no hydraulic plant failures, and I feel certain, that had repairs been necessary, they would have been requested at the time of my visit.

5.Q. Are there any other facts concerning the subject matter of this investigation you care to set forth?

A. Yes. I felt very strongly, after being associated with the ship, that the officers and men had a tremendous respect and admiration for the Commanding Officer, and also for the Executive Officer, indicating a very high morale existing in the ship.

The investigating officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statements covering anything relating to the subject matter of the investigation which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The investigation was finished.

After full and mature deliberation, the investigating officer finds as follows:

SECRET

Finding of Facts

1. That the U.S.S. Capelin departed from Darwin, Australia on her first war patrol on 30 October 1943.
2. That she returned to Darwin on 16 November 1943 because of a defective conning tower hatch mechanism, excessively noisy bow planes and defective radar tube, all of which developed during her first patrol.
3. That the derangements were corrected to the satisfaction of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Capelin, and that the ship then departed on her second patrol at about 1930 on 17 November 1943.
4. That nothing further has positively been seen nor heard of the U.S.S. Capelin since that date. The U.S.S. Bonerfish upon return from her second war patrol, reported, that at 1753 (H), 2 December, in latitude 1° - 10' N, longitude 123° - 50' E, she sighted a submarine to seaward at a range of about four miles. This was in the area to which the Capelin was assigned. There are indications of the activity of the Capelin which for security reasons, cannot be divulged.
5. That one attempt to communicate with the Capelin by radio from Headquarters, Commander Task Force Seventy-One on 9 December 1943, elicited no response nor acknowledgement.
6. That the operation order and annexes thereto, under which she was conducting her patrol were clear and complete.
7. That her assigned route, to and from her operating area, was enemy controlled, but was not considered particularly hazardous, nor was her operating area itself considered unduly dangerous.
8. That all friendly forces were adequately informed concerning her routing, and that so far as is known, the U.S.S. Bonerfish is the only friendly unit which made visual or other contact with a submarine in these areas during the period under question.
9. That the Commanding Officer was courageous and very aggressive, that his competence as a submarine captain was outstanding.
10. That the officers and men were very well trained, and the ship well handled, both surface and submerged. It was considered well above average from this standpoint.
11. That the material condition of the Capelin upon departure on her second war patrol was generally excellent, no defects were known to exist, and both the Commanding Officer and the Division Commander were satisfied that the Capelin was in all respects ready for the next patrol.
12. That there was nothing, other than the normal hazards of aggressive contacts with a formidable enemy, which could explain her failure to return.

SECRET

Recommendation

From a thorough examination of documents appended, marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, intelligence information which does not appear, and from testimony adduced, it is not considered that any steps to improve current operational procedures, as carried out by Commander Task Force Seventy-One, are indicated.

Clayton S. Isgrig
Clayton S. Isgrig,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Investigating Officer.

OPERATION ORDER 37-43 no serial of 23 October 1943
Was removed to the World War II Planning Material
Files on 27 August 1962.

NAVAL MESSAGE

LIEUT COMDR AUSTIN OF COD IS FATHER OF BABY GIRL CONGRATULATIONS X
SERIAL 22 X MARSHALL LOOK OUT FOR LATTA PASSING THROUGH OSCAR
ABOUT TWENTY SEVENTH

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

E. B. Rhoads

E. B. RHOADS, Lieut. U.S.N.R.

ORIGINATING OFFICER **11**

COPY TO _____

REC'D _____

RELEASED BY _____

T.O.D.

HOW TRANSMITTED:

SYSTEM: **108-S**

ORIGINATOR

ACTION

INFORMATION

CTF 71

TO 71.1

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PRECEDENCE:

ROUTINE

CODING:

BENSON

TYPING:

LANGLEY

DATE:

26 NOV 1943

OUTGOING

C

NAVAL MESSAGE

HARDIN LUCAS AND MARSHALL X SERIAL 49 X IF PRUDENT
GIVE ONE WORD REPORT NUMBER TORPEDOES REMAINING

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

E. B. Rhoads
E. B. RHOADS, Lieut. USNR.

ORIGINATING OFFICER _____

COPY TO _____

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091440																

PRECEDENCE:

CODING:

TYPING:

DATE:

ROUTINE

OUTGOING

9 DEC 1943

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NAVAL MESSAGE

CAPELIN DEPARTED DARWIN THIRTY OCTOBER WITH COMSUBDIV ONE SIXTY TWO
 EMBARKED X PATROLLED BANDA AND FLORES SEAS X SANK FOUR THOUSAND TON
 UNIDENTIFIED AK IN BANDA SEA AND THIRTY THREE SIXTY TON AK HUNTAMA MARU
 NORTH KELANG STRAIT ELEVEN NOVEMBER X RETURNED DARWIN FIFTEENTH
 DISEMBARKED DIV COMDR FUELLED EFFECTED MINOR REPAIRS X DEPARTED SEVENTEENTH
 FOR PATROL MOLUKKA AND CELEBES SEAS X SCHEDULED DEPART AREA SIX DECEMBER
 X COMSUBS SEVENTH FLEET SENDS ACTION COM SEVENTH FLEET X
 VIA OMBAY STRAIT FOR FREMANTLE ETA FIFTEENTH X NO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED
 FROM CAPELIN SINCE DEPARTURE DARWIN SEVENTEEN NOVEMBER X THERE HAVE BEEN
 SEVERAL INDICATIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES OF BLUE SUIMARINE ACTIVITY IN HER
 AREA X ALSO ON ONE DECEMBER BOWFIN SIGHTED SUB OFF STROOMEN KAAP CELEBES
 AND TWO DECEMBER BONEFISH SIGHTED SUB APPROX POSIT (1-30N 123-00E) X
 BELIEVE BOTH THESE SIGHTINGS WERE CAPELIN X MESSAGE ON NINTH REQUESTING
 DESPATCH REPLY HAS NOT BEEN ANSWERED X REGRETFULLY REPORT CAPELIN
 CONSIDERED OVERDUE SINCE FIFTEEN DECEMBER X

ORIGINATING OFFICER

11

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY: E.B. RHODES, LT.D-V(G), USNR.

COPY TO

REC'D

RELEASED BY

T.O.D.

HOW TRANSMITTED:

SYSTEM

ORIGINATOR

ACTION

INFORMATION

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COM7TH FLT

DATE AND
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PRECEDENCE:

CODING:

TYPING

DATE:

ROUTINE

OUTGOING

20 DECEMBER, 1943.

E

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

JOB ORDERS - COMMUNICATION

1. Install twin conductor shielded cable in forward torpedo room from auxiliary sound jackbox to NM junction box to permit use of NM receiver on JK-QC and JK projectors.
2. Renew flooded lead (shielded cable) in JP installation for hydrophone to receiver. Inspect hydrophone for salt deposit and remove if found.
3. Shift connection on sound receivers in Conning Tower to permit use of ear phones in forward torpedo room with loudspeaker in Conning Tower turned off. (Present installation necessitates loudspeaker being on in Conning Tower in order to use earphones in forward torpedo room).
4. Check and repair ECM as necessary. (Keys "E" and "R" stick occasionally).
5. Overhaul Underwood typewriter furnished by ship.

JOB ORDERS - GUNNERY

1. Install two (2) short straps and two (2) buckles on the flap and bottom edges of each of two 20 mm expended cartridge bags. Location of straps and buckles as designated by gunner's mate when 20 mm bags are furnished to tender by ship.
2. Install grease fitting on each hinge of 4" / 50 cal. ready service locker door and securing arm to permit grease lubrication between heavy bearing surfaces. (4 grease fittings required).
3. Remove 1/32 inch from diameter of smaller end of brass dowels (4) furnished by ship.
4. Manufacture four brass dowels as per sample furnished by ship (for cocking 20 mm guns).
5. Inspect and adjust T.D.C. as necessary to remove excess noise from position keeper side when T.D.C. is running.
6. Of thirty after angle solver test problems six do not check within limits allowed, though not far outside given allowances. These differences occur only at gyro angles between 70 and 100 degrees left. Check and remedy if possible without causing appreciable change in results of other angle solver test problems which now have favorable results.

SECRET

E. L. Lamerstein
Ship's Clerk, USN

F

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

WORK REQUESTS (Electrical)

1. Gyro Compass. Conduct quarterly inspection of master and auxiliary gyro compass. (HOLT - CEM).
2. 1. M.C. speaker system. Check throat mike circuit for cause of insufficient gain and rectify - (BUTLER CEM).
3. Conning Tower Motor Order Telegraph Operating Handle Shaft. Manufacture and install two shafts as per sample except make new shaft 1 1/4" longer than sample. (BALLARD - CEM).
4. Shaft revolution indicator transmitter. Provide means of disengaging shaft revolution counter transmitter from bull gear on shaft. Sketch attached is method suggested by ship. Purpose is to allow disengaging revolution counter when rigged for silent running. (BALLARD - CEM).
5. Install sheet metal kick plate over cables in hatch coaming between lower Conning Tower hatch and Conning Tower deck plate. (KRAIL - EMlc.).
6. Provide welder to install a pad-eye #1 periscope well. Ship's force will furnish pad-eye. (KRAIL - EMlc.).
7. Manufacture one mat for maneuvering room deck as per sketch attached to work request. Material Canvas backed with felt or coco matting. (BALLARD - CEM).

SECRET

F

U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

WORK REQUESTS - ENGINEERING MECHANICAL

1. Main Engine (General Motors, Model 248).
Assist ship's force in overhaul of one (1) main engine by accomplishing miscellaneous machine shop work as may be found necessary.
2. Kleinschmidt Vapor Compressor: Acid Clean two (2) distiller units.
3. Auxiliary Engine (General Motors Model 268):
Repair leak in cooling water jumper between two (2) sections of exhaust header.
4. Lub oil and fuel oil Purifiers: Install a union in purifier feedline to each purifier to allow pulling of drag assembly. All joints are at present silver soldered.
5. Kleinschmidt Vapor Compressor: Install a cross connection between brine tank overboard discharge and feed pump suction as per sketch attached to work request. Connection is to be used in conserving fresh water when double distilling.
6. Special tools: Manufacture the following special tools:
 - A. Piston pin cap removing tool (as per sketch attached to work request).
 - B. Wrist pin drift pin (as per sketch attached).
 - C. Valve depressor (Template will be furnished Shipfitter shop).
 - D. Main bearing replacement tool (If none available on tender manufacture as per sketch to be furnished by ship).
7. Chemical analysis: Analyse following samples as indicated:
 - A. Seven (7) lub oil sump samples for:
 - (a) Fuel dilution.
 - (b) Neutralization number.
 - (c) Viscosity at 100 degrees F.
 - (d) Precipitation number.
 - B. Fresh water tank samples (4) for:
 - (a) Suitability for use as portable water.
 - C. Battery water tank and distiller discharge samples (5) for:
 - (a) Suitability for use as battery water.
 - D. Air conditioning condensate samples (2) for:
 - (a) Suitability for use as portable water.
 - (b) Suitability for use as Battery Water.

SECRET

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U.S.S. CAPELIN (SS289)

ENGINEERING JOB ORDERS - (MACH.)

8. Relocate following Main Engine Gauges to prevent excessive vibration:

- (a) Four (4) fuel oil motor block gauges - mounting bracket to be supported by deck plate instead of engine frame. No additional material required.
- (b) Four (4) air scavenging gauges - mounting to be supported by bulkhead instead of engine frame.

9. Cooler Operating Valves.

Shorten operating cable to #4 Main Engine fresh water cooler to permit proper operation.

10. Main Engine Fuel Transfer Block:

Drill and retap oversized one fuel oil transfer block. Manufacture one oversized blind nut to fit new dimensions of transfer block. Ship will furnish present blind nut as a sample.

SECRET

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LIST OF REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS HELD BY U.S.S. CAPELIN AS OF
18 OCTOBER 1943


CSP 847 (A)	SP 442
CSP 1247/8 (K)	SP 443
CSP 1247/8 (L)	SP 444
CSP 1247/8 (M)	SP 445
CSP 1247/8 (N)	SP 446
CSP 1270 (AR)	SP 446(A)
CSP 1270 (AS)	SP 446(2)
CSP 1270 (AT)	SP 447
CSP 1270 (AU)	ACD 653(43)
CSP 1270 (AV)	ACD 07/4
CSP 1286 (M)	ASD 02 (AB)
CSP 1286 (N)	ASD 02 (AC)
CSP 1286 (O)	ASD 02 (AD)
CSP 1311 (A)	ASD 02 (AE)
CSP 1312 (N)	ASRS 6
CSP 1501 (A)	CB 01618Q(41)
CSP 1521 (A)	HO 184
CSP 1524 (B)	HO 187
CSP 1525/6 (L)	NDP-1(A)
CSP 1525/6 (M)	USF 7-A SUPP
CSP 1525/6 (N)	CSP 1270 (AQ)
CSP 1525/6 (O)	
CSP 1605 (BJ)	
CSP 1605 (BK)	
CSP 1605 (BL)	
CSP 1607 (JG)	
CSP 1607 (JH)	
CSP 1607 (JI)	
SP 274(16)	
SP 274(17)	
SP 274(18)	
SP 274(19)	
SP 376(2)	
SP 378(4)	
SP 382	
SP 440(1)	
SP 440(2)	
SP 441	

SECRET

END OF REEL

JOB NO.

F 108
AR-116-78



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